We study an entrepreneur's pricing strategy in a reward-based crowdfunding campaign to signal product
quality to backers. First, we characterize two signaling mechanisms: One- and two-price signaling. In one-price
signaling, the entrepreneur posts his price in the funding period and a target financing level on a
platform while the spot price would be posted just after a successful campaign. In two-price signaling,
the entrepreneur commits to both the funding and spot prices at the beginning of the campaign. After a
successful campaign (funding period), the entrepreneur solicits the pledge, delivers the pre-sold products to
backers and then continues to sell to the spot market. Different from the existing literature, we show that just a
single low funding price might credibly signal product quality to backers in one-price signaling because of the
spot selling opportunity and the probabilistic nature of campaign success. We also show that in two-price
signaling, commitment to a higher future spot price can always credibly signal product quality to potential
backers. When both one- and two-price signaling are possible, we characterize the preference of entrepreneurs
over them. In particular, we show that two-price signaling dominates one-price signaling only when the gap
in potential high and low-quality levels is neither large nor small. Moreover, the funding period market size
should not be small compared with the spot period. A large spot market results in pooling equilibrium in
one-price signaling and costless signaling in two-price signaling.